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Deep brain stimulation (DBS), a favored 
treatment  option  for  Parkinson’s  disease 
and treatment resistant depression, restores 
disrupted  brain  mechanisms  to  default 
states and is likely to extend to mental and 
movement  disorders  and  neurodegen-
erative conditions. All are associated with 
gradual cognitive, affective and/or behav-
ioral changes. DBS confronts family/carers 
with emotionally, physically, and mentally 
trying challenges, as successful symptomatic 
relief may be accompanied by instantane-
ous  apparent  identity  changes.  Patients 
become restored to a previous state, “nor-
mal” or species-typical in ways they have 
never been, or placed in an enhanced state 
of subjective well-being. They are likely to 
feel like a new person, both to themselves 
and to others. How clinicians conceptualize 
patients’ post-DBS personality changes has 
profound ethical implications not only for 
the patient but also for their family/carers. 
These amplify existing conflicts of interests.
Some involve patients, family/carers, and 
healthcare authorities. Family/carers look-
ing after patients with neurodegenerative 
conditions,  mood  disorders,  and  brain 
injuries in the home conserve healthcare 
resources  at  considerable  personal  cost. 
They are increasingly subject to coercive 
expectations  of  affection  and  day-to-day 
care  for  the  aging  and  infirm  as  demo-
graphic changes foster devolution of care 
from hospitals to homes. These resource-
driven policies tend to be couched in terms 
of the rhetoric of patient choice, e.g., dein-
stitutionalization  of  neurorehabilitation 
and hospice services on the grounds that 
most of us wish to die at home. Family/
carers are placed in an invidious position 
as  they  are  expected  to  function  almost 
as ancillary members of clinical teams in 
terms of providing care, yet lack the author-
ity, training, remuneration, and legal safe-
guards accorded clinicians.
The potential of DBS to provide symp-
tomatic relief could spare healthcare budg-
ets and family/carers’ personal resources. 
Devolution  from  hospitals  to  homes 
depends upon family/carers providing day-
to-day  care,  monitoring  patients’  condi-
tions and taking momentous decisions, like 
assessing decision-making competence and 
capacity after the cognitive, affective, and 
behavioral changes DBS is likely to treat. 
As increasing proportions of the popula-
tion will suffer from chronic conditions, or 
be involved in looking after the seriously 
impaired at home, the financial, and clini-
cal implications of successful DBS treat-
ment are immense. Patients, family/carers 
and society at large could reap significant 
benefits from symptomatic relief leading 
to returns to paid employment, increased 
social participation, and release from carer 
burden. Yet these benefits must be balanced 
against the risks of conflicts of interest aris-
ing from the impact of post-DBS personal-
ity changes on family/carers.
Both  sudden  and  gradual  personal-
ity/identity  changes  stress  family/carers. 
Conditions like stroke and traumatic brain 
injury can cause sudden identity alterations, 
while gradual changes characterize neurode-
generative conditions. Family/carers experi-
ence poorer mental and physical health and 
more  stress  where  patients’  personalities 
have changed. They report more resilience 
when there has been cognitive but not affec-
tive change so affectionate relations are pre-
served. Caring for someone where love and 
affection continue is understandably easier 
than providing services for someone who 
may look the same, but feels and behaves 
like a stranger (Mackenzie and Sakel, 2011). 
Clinical strategies emphasize constructing 
narratives providing continuities of iden-
tity, as where neurorehabilitative goal-set-
ting supports recovery of self and capacities 
after  sudden  changes,  or  narratives  con-
necting past memories and present events 
preserve fading self-concepts in dementia. 
Family/carers who adhere to these stories 
are more able to continue to provide care 
on the basis of affection for those who still 
feel like their loved ones, despite   clinically 
induced changes. Narratives provide a con-
text of continuous meaning for patients’ 
personality changes which allow for grief 
for the loss of capacities, but continuity of 
caring (Ylvisaker et al., 2008).
Post-DBS personality changes are dif-
ferent. Patients may not behave or feel like 
familiar damaged or diseased loved ones, 
but like healthy strangers with claims on 
family/carers’  time,  affection,  and  assets. 
While cognitive and behavioral incapaci-
ties characterize patients with stroke, brain 
injury, and dementia, affectionate mutuality 
often continues, so that family/carers feel 
that the relationship is maintained despite 
misfortune. Yet conditions where patients 
maintain their cognitive abilities, but lose 
their capacities for empathy, insight into 
their own behavior and considering oth-
ers’ interests, as in “acquired sociopathy” 
associated with behavioral variant fronto- 
temporal  dementia,  are  notorious  for 
placing  the  maximum  burden  on  carers 
(Mackenzie and Sakel, 2011). Thus, fam-
ily/carers of DBS patients are likely to be 
faced  with  significant  stresses  associated 
with being linked to those who look like 
their loved ones, but may behave quite dif-
ferently, value very different things, and be 
unconstrained by past ties of affection.
Family/carers are likely to feel guilty and 
conflicted if they prefer patients who were 
previously suffering from serious clinical 
symptoms, yet remained affectionate, to the 
same patients in their post-DBS state where 
DBS results in altered personalities, values, 
and choices over ways of life. Grieving for 
the lost person’s presence may feel unethical 
in that serious symptoms have been alle-
viated, but, where the healthy person feels 
like a stranger, their claims on family/carers’ 
time, affection, and assets may feel inap-
propriate  and  unjustified.  Unanticipated 
breakdowns of relationships, dispersal of 
familial assets and inordinate stress on fam-
ily/carers are likely outcomes, which should 
be addressed carefully in pre-DBS informed 
consent  procedures.  This  is  particularly 
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doi: 10.3389/fnint.2011.00012assets.  Where  patients  eligible  for  DBS 
are  incompetent,  family/carers  may  be 
tempted  to  influence  discussions  over 
whether DBS is in patients’ best interests, 
or to institutionalize them prematurely. 
Access to outside interference with DBS 
mechanisms and settings may need to be 
restricted, as may the range of settings able 
to be chosen.
This opinion has sketched out some con-
flicts of interest which may arise between 
healthcare authorities, clinicians, patients, 
and  family/carers  post-DBS  treatment. 
Yet the promise of DBS to transform the 
well-being of all parties is commensurately 
immense. In the light of these factors, as well 
as others which space constraints prevent 
my mentioning, there is an urgent need for 
ethical guidelines on DBS.
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chosen to enable which personality char-
acteristics (Mackenzie, 2011). Boundaries 
between neurodiversity and neurodysfunc-
tion are likely to be bitterly contested.
Should symptomatic relief be accom-
panied by altered personality traits leading 
to relationship breakdown and dispersal of 
family assets, family/carers may want some 
say  in  choices  over  treatment  outcomes. 
Yet as clinicians’ duty of care is to patients 
alone,  where  post-DBS  personality  traits 
are  clinically  equivalent,  patients  should 
be accorded autonomous choice. Clinicians 
would retain a duty to ensure that patients 
were  informed  of  the  risks  and  options 
accompanying  their  choices. As  patients’ 
risk preferences are likely to alter with DBS 
treatment, questions arise over which of a 
range of possible states should be accepted 
as a basis for autonomous choices. Should 
the choice over settings of the patient in 
a risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking 
state be accepted? As conditions treated by 
DBS involve cognitive, affective, and behav-
ioral  alterations,  patients’  pre-treatment 
states  cannot  be  seen  as  more  authentic 
than any of a range of clinically equivalent 
post-treatment states of being.
Clinicians may feel an ethical obliga-
tion to redress such conflicts of interest 
by including family/carers in the informed 
consent  procedures,  or  suggesting  they 
obtain legal advice on protecting familial 
assets pre-DBS. Yet clinicians also need 
to  protect  their  patients.  They  should 
monitor refusals of DBS treatment and 
assess how autonomous patients’ choices 
over post-DBS settings are in relation to 
undue influence or coercion. Family/car-
ers may attempt to manipulate patients 
to refuse DBS or to choose settings which 
preserve  affectionate  bonds  and  family 
crucial as competent patients whose values 
change post-DBS could repudiate advance 
decisions made pre-DBS.
Deep brain stimulation effects’ revers-
ibility also provokes unique ethical dilem-
mas.  Neuromodulatory  stimuli  may  be 
turned on or off and up or down. Using DBS 
to map connections between neural mech-
anisms, specific brain locations, subjective 
experiences  and  ways  of  behaving  may 
provide evidence allowing for choice over 
where settings should be to ensure desired 
personality traits post-DBS. Accompanying 
disruptions are inevitable in diagnostic cat-
egories and conceptions of what constitutes 
normality,  neurodiversity,  and  neurodys-
function. Clinicians may become able to 
use DBS to create tailor-made personali-
ties for patients. After taxonomic upheavals, 
an increased range of personality traits are 
likely to become accepted as neurodiverse 
rather  than  neurodysfunctional.  This  all 
impacts on clinicians’ ethical responsibili-
ties, as it may be possible to provide DBS 
in ways which are clinically equivalent, but 
have varied outcomes in terms of patients’ 
personality and behavioral changes. How 
choices amongst settings determining this 
should be made, and by whom, is unclear.
Patients are likely to choose settings ena-
bling them to feel “better than well,” whereas 
family/carers may prefer personality traits 
more like their familiar loved ones’. Should 
either  be  clinically  preferable,  it  should 
prevail. Yet no ethical guidelines exist for 
choosing between clinically equivalent set-
tings. Eschewing extreme settings may be 
deplored  as  coerced  normalization  and 
there are no clear grounds for consider-
ing specific settings as guaranteeing more 
authentic patient identities. Conflicts are 
inevitable  over  which  settings  should  be 
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